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Abstract: On coming to power in 2006 President Morales made a radical break with the US 
backed anti-drugs strategy, which focused on the forced eradication of coca leaf and the 
criminalization of coca growers. The new policy, often referred to as ‘coca yes cocaine no,’ 
draws on the coca growers’ own distinction between coca leaf (which has been consumed 
by Indigenous Andeans for millennia) and cocaine, the illicit drug. The strategy legalized the 
cultivation of a small amount of coca leaf in specific zones, encouraged the coca unions to 
self-police to ensure growers do not exceed this limit, and envisions the industrialization and 
export of coca based products. The overriding aim of the policy is to reduce harms to coca 
grower communities. Drawing on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in the Chapare, one of 
Bolivia’s two main coca growing regions, this chapter explains how the this new policy has 
been operationalized. It is argued that the coca farmers have made significant sacrifices to 
implement the new policy and that it represents a viable, less damaging alterative to the 
forced eradication of coca crops. 
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Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party secured overwhelming victories 
in the 2005, 2009 and 2014 presidential and legislative elections. On coming to power 
President Morales (the leader of the Chapare coca growers’ unions) made a radical break 
with the US-backed anti-drugs strategy, which focused on the forced eradication of coca leaf 
and the criminalisation of coca growers. The new policy, often referred to as ‘coca yes 
cocaine no’, draws on the coca growers’ own distinction between coca leaf (which has been 
consumed by indigenous Andeans for millennia) and cocaine, the illicit drug. The strategy 
legalised the cultivation of a small amount of coca leaf in specific zones, encourages the 
coca unions to self-police to ensure growers do not exceed this limit, and envisions the 
industrialisation and export of coca-based products. The overriding aim of the policy is to 
reduce harms to coca grower communities.  
The new approach has shrunk coca cultivation and has had various positive impacts, 
including dramatically cutting human rights violations and allowing coca growers to diversify 
their sources of income. Nevertheless, cooperative coca control remains controversial. The 
US has been particularly critical, citing evidence that the illegal cocaine trade has expanded 
in recent years. In 2008 the White House put Bolivia on a blacklist of countries that do not 
cooperate in the fight against drug trafficking, a decision that has been renewed every year 
since. Being blacklisted or ‘de-certified’ brought with it a range of sanctions including the 
withholding of US development aid, credit and trade benefits.  
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Drawing on long-term ethnographic fieldwork (thirty months of research spread over several 
visits between 2005 and 2014)1 in the Chapare, one of Bolivia’s two main coca growing 
regions, this chapter explains the lived reality of the coca farmers and how they have 
experienced a range of coca control policies. The chapter begins by outlining coca 
cultivation in Bolivia. It then provides an analysis of the harms generated by forced 
eradication and the failure of US-backed development projects to offer poor farmers realistic 
economic alternatives to coca. The second half of the chapter focuses on Morales’s new 
coca policy and explains how it is put into operation by the Chapare coca growers’ unions. It 
is argued that the farmers have made significant sacrifices to implement the new policy and 
that it represents a viable, less damaging alternative to the forced eradication of coca crops.  
 
Coca in Bolivia 
Coca (Erythroxylum coca), a hardy bush, has been cultivated on the eastern slopes of the 
Andes for at least 4,000 years. Around one in three Bolivians regularly consume coca or 
coca-based products (La Razón 2013a). Coca can be either chewed or prepared as a tea 
and is used in order to supress feelings of hunger, thirst and fatigue. Coca also serves 
important social, religious and cultural functions. For example, coca forms a vital component 
of rituals such as offerings to the Pachamama and Supay (Andean earth deities), and it is 
used to cure a broad range of ailments (Carter and Mamani 1986).  
Ever since the arrival of the Spanish to the New World, debates have raged over the use, 
production and legality of coca and its derivatives. In 1961 the status of coca leaf as a 
dangerous drug was enshrined in international law with its listing, alongside cocaine and 
heroin, in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (the most important piece of international 
drug control legislation). The convention, which Bolivia signed in 1976, establishes that 
governments should uproot all coca bushes in their territory (even those that grow wild) and 
that the traditional practice of coca leaf chewing must be abolished within 25 years of 
ratification. The 1961 convention therefore provided the justification and legal framework for 
subsequent US-backed coca eradication campaigns.  
According to UN data, Bolivia is the world’s third largest producer of coca leaf after Peru and 
Colombia, with some 23,000 hectares under cultivation. In 2013 Bolivia’s dried coca leaf 
market was valued at US$283 million, representing 9.4% of GDP in the agricultural sector 
(UNODC 2014). Bolivia has two principal coca-growing zones: the Yungas of La Paz, where 
two thirds of Bolivia’s crop is produced, and the Chapare, which accounts for most of the 
rest. Given the cultural significance attached to coca in Bolivia, lawmakers were required to 
permit limited coca leaf production to supply the domestic traditional market. Thus, Bolivia’s 
anti-drug Law 1008 (passed under intense pressure from the US in 1988) dictates that 
12,000 hectares of coca can be legally cultivated in designated ‘traditional growing zones’, 
principally the Yungas of La Paz. All other coca, including that grown in the Chapare, was 
outlawed and slated for eradication. The Chapare coca growers have always viewed this 
distinction in Law 1008 to be arbitrary and deeply unfair.  President Morales has committed 
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to repeal Law 1008 and replace it with two different laws, one for coca and another for 
controlled substances. In July 2015 the new coca law was being developed in conjunction 
with the country’s coca grower organizations 
The Chapare  
This chapter focuses on coca control efforts the Tropics of Cochabamba (henceforth referred 
to as the Chapare) as it is here where US-backed eradication campaigns were most forceful, 
but also because it was the Chapare coca unions that developed the alternative coca control 
strategy, to be discussed below.  
The Chapare is a tropical agricultural zone located in the centre of the country. The 
population comprises Quechua-speaking peasants, and former miners and factory workers 
from the highlands, many of whom migrated to the region in the early 1980s in search of 
opportunities in the coca-cocaine economy. The settler families established small family-run 
farms and relied on manual labour to cultivate rice, bananas, citrus fruit and coca. Others 
found work labouring in rudimentary operations to soak shredded coca leaf in solvents to 
extract the cocaine alkaloid and produce cocaine paste (the first step to refining pure 
cocaine). In the mid-1980s the coca-cocaine industry provided jobs for up to 20% of the 
nation’s workforce and generated around US$600 million annually, equal to all other legal 
exports combined (Painter 1994: 49).  
Influenced by the structure of the agrarian unions in the valleys of Cochabamba, the settlers 
organised themselves into self-governing units called sindicatos and set out into the jungle to 
claim land. The first thing they did was to clear an area for a football pitch and construct a 
barn for their monthly community meetings. Given the historic absence of the state, the 
sindicatos assumed the role of local governance; to this day they are responsible for 
assigning land, administering justice, taxing the coca trade and undertaking community 
projects such as building schools or roads (Grisaffi 2013). There are in excess of 1,000 
sindicatos, which in turn are grouped into six federations representing some 45,000 coca 
grower families in total. The women are also organised in a parallel federation.  
The small-scale farmers grow coca because it has several comparative advantages as a 
cash crop. Coca grows like a weed in places where other crops do not (on steep slopes, in 
acidic soil and at altitude), it reaches maturity after only one year, and it can be harvested 
once every three to four months, providing the family with a regular source of income. The 
work of planting and maintaining coca involves both sexes of all ages, and the main tools 
(including a machete, digging stick, and a back-pack mounted crop sprayer) are cheap and 
widely available in rural areas. Coca has a high value to weight ratio; this is important 
because many farmers live far from the nearest road and may have to carry produce long 
distances on their back. Finally and most importantly, while the price varies considerably, 
there is always a guaranteed market for coca. Merchants often buy dried coca leaf directly 
from the farm gate (sometimes paying for half of it in advance), saving the farmer effort, time 
and money.  
The farmers do not get rich from cultivating coca. Rather, it complements subsistence 
farming and, in the absence of other income generating activities, is one of the few pursuits 
that provide them with access to cash. As one female union leader explains, “Coca is our 
subsistence – it allows our children to study and pays for our clothes, visits to the doctor, 
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and our food.” The majority of Chapare farmers live below the poverty line. Away from the 
main towns houses are built from rough-cut planks with beaten mud floors, and many do not 
have electricity, sanitation or running water.  
Crop eradication and conditional development 
A cornerstone of US counter-drug strategy in the Andean region has been the eradication of 
coca crops. The justification for destroying crops is that it prevents them from being 
processed into drugs and subsequently traded on the international market. Eradication is 
often carried out manually: teams of eradicators (normally military conscripts) accompanied 
by heavily armed members of the police enter small farmsteads to uproot the crops.2 While 
coca eradication enjoys strong support among US policymakers, there is a growing body of 
research which indicates that it does not meet its targets and generates wide-ranging 
harmful impacts (Dion and Russler 2008, Mejía 2010, Mansfield 2011).  
The US launched a coca eradication campaign in the Chapare in the mid-1980s. Initially 
eradication was carried out in collaboration with coca grower communities and the state 
even paid farmers compensation (at a rate of around US$2,000 per hectare eradicated). 
However, this all changed in 1997 when, in an attempt to curry favour with the US embassy, 
the Banzer administration (1997-2001) launched the Dignity Plan, a no-holds-barred 
accelerated coca eradication campaign with the aim to destroy the entire Chapare crop by 
2002. The Dignity Plan dramatically reduced the amount of land under coca cultivation in the 
Chapare,3 and was hailed by the US as a significant victory in the ‘war on drugs’. However, 
this success came at a high social cost.  
Eradication outpaced the provision of development assistance and plunged the coca grower 
families into severe economic crisis. Worse still, the decision to orientate the security forces 
towards ‘internal enemies’ provoked violent confrontations and opened the space for the 
violation of human rights. The US-trained and funded forces sent on eradication missions 
were denounced for a range of atrocities including murder, rape, theft, torching homesteads, 
beatings and torture.4 Under the terms of the draconian anti-drug Law 1008, hundreds of 
farmers were arrested for drugs-related offences on little or no evidence, and held 
indefinitely without charge (Ledebur 2005). Unsurprisingly the government’s policy of ‘zero 
coca’ in the Chapare came to be seen locally as ‘zero cocaleros’.  
While the bulk of US funding was dedicated to eradication and law enforcement, the US also 
provided coca farmers with assistance to encourage them to grow legal crops. However, 
with few exceptions, local people say that US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
backed projects did little to improve their lives. These projects were beset by problems in 
terms of the sequencing of aid (farmers had to uproot their coca before receiving 
assistance), the kind of assistance that was on offer, and the manner in which projects were 
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executed. For example, farmers complained that given the lack of markets for the tropical 
products promoted by USAID (such as pineapples, palm heart and bananas), it often made 
more sense to let the crops rot in the fields than to go to the expense and effort of harvesting 
them. They also said that USAID agri-business projects did little to stimulate the local 
economy and only generated a handful of low-paid jobs. Finally, USAID’s policy of non-
collaboration with the coca unions sowed mistrust and provoked division within coca grower 
communities. Local farmers came to the conclusion that USAID intended to break the union 
through a strategy of divide and rule. In June 2008 the unions announced that they would no 
longer sign new aid agreements with USAID. 
The cato accord 
The state’s repressive policies helped to strengthen the farmers’ resolve to defend the right 
to grow coca, which they cast as an issue of national sovereignty (Grisaffi 2010). Throughout 
the 1990s and into the 2000s, the coca unions led mass protests, marches and road 
blockades that made the country ungovernable. In 2004, President Carlos Mesa (2003-
2005) caved in to the Chapare farmers’ demands and permitted each union member to grow 
a limited amount of coca known as a cato (1,600 square metre plot) in established cultivation 
zones, to ensure some basic income. With the launch of the ‘cato accord’, protests, violence 
and human rights violations decreased immediately. The ‘cato’ was only ever supposed to 
be a temporary measure to defuse the mounting social and political tensions. However, on 
assuming office President Morales made it a central pillar of his coca policy. Morales 
permitted 7,000 hectares of coca to be grown in the Chapare and a further 1,000 hectares in 
other ‘transitional’ zones.5  The MAS government, in collaboration with the coca unions and 
supported by the European Union, has since developed a sophisticated coca monitoring, 
control and reduction system.  
To be eligible for a cato of coca, the growers first have to gain an official land title and have 
their cato measured and registered by the state coca monitoring institution, UDESTRO,6 
which then carries out recurring measurement every two years. As part of the monitoring 
effort the European Union has funded a biometric register of coca producers and distributed 
identity cards. Building on this infrastructure it is then up to the local level sindicatos to 
exercise internal controls (referred to as ‘social control’) to ensure that farmers respect the 
one cato limit.7 The sindicatos are well placed to enact social control as they have a long 
history of self-governing (Grisaffi 2013). 
Coca control is a shared responsibility, which involves the entire community. Each base level 
sindicato organises regular inspections of coca plantations; commissions are formed of local 
members and often include people from neighbouring communities. If the commission finds 
coca above the one cato limit, then the community will eradicate the entire crop and prohibit 
the farmer from replanting any coca for one year. Because of the time it takes for coca to 
mature, this effectively means two years without any coca income. If a farmer violates the 
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rule more than once, then the sindicato imposes a life-time ban on growing coca. Farmers 
claim that the new system is more effective than the previous US-financed ‘zero coca’ policy. 
One man explained that under the old policy, when the military pulled up his coca he could 
replant without any immediate repercussion. “Before, when we planted the coca and they 
ripped it up, we would re-plant and they would rip it up again.” However, he said that today 
it’s “jodido” (really harsh): “… everyone knows how much coca you have and they will 
denounce anyone who plants more than a cato.” The threats are real: to date more than 800 
growers in the Chapare have lost their cato for breaking the agreement (Opinión 2014). 
The farmers have good reasons to respect the agreement, they understand that if coca 
cultivation is restricted, then prices will increase. As one farmer put it, “We work less, but 
make more money.” A strong sense of community pride also motivates people. One farmer 
said: “If you do not respect the cato then you make the whole sindicato look bad.” Sindicatos 
that do not exercise adequate levels of control are singled out for criticism at union meetings 
and on the coca union’s radio station. This can have serious material implications: for 
example, union leaders and municipal councillors confirmed that public works funding would 
be suspended for sindicatos that do not respect the cato. In a region where many lack 
access to basic services, including roads, electricity and sanitation, this constitutes a 
significant threat. One union leader said: “If you go to the Town Hall and your sindicato has 
not respected the cato, it’s like having a criminal record. No one will attend to you.” Finally, 
the coca growers identify strongly with the goals of the MAS administration; growers 
consider that respecting the cato will support the government’s attempts to lobby the UN to 
decriminalise coca. As one male union leader notes, “We respect the cato to make the 
international community shut up.” 
Notwithstanding these advances, there are challenges associated with implementing the 
new policy. For example, some farmers have managed to illegally acquire more than one 
cato by sub-dividing existing plots or buying up additional land and then registering it under a 
false name. The coca unions are aware of these practices and over the past five years have 
made serious efforts to eliminate so-called ‘ghost catos’ (catos fantasmas). Of more concern 
is the impact that land titling has had on the union organisation itself. Land titling (combined 
with restricted legal coca cultivation) has led to a steep increase in land prices in the region. 
In turn this has contributed to rising levels of inequality between coca grower households.  
Some farmers complain that their richer neighbours use cash to influence community 
decisions, undermining the egalitarian ethos that characterises sindicato democracy (Grisaffi 
2013). There is also an emerging generational divide between land owners and their 
children, many of whom have been priced out of the market and have no hope of acquiring 
their own land or a cato of coca. Finally, by taking control of land away from the community 
and handing it to the state, land titling has, in effect, undermined sindicato authority.8 In the 
longer term these trends could have an impact on the community’s ability to effectively self-
police. 
A minority of farmers quite simply refuse to comply with the regime. In these situations, 
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workers from UDESTRO negotiate with community leaders, and if needs be they will 
organise for the coca to be forcibly eradicated by government troops. However, in contrast to 
the recent past, eradication is no longer accompanied by violence. One middle-aged female 
grower said: “These days we don’t rebel when the coca cutters enter our plots; we just show 
them where the coca is and let them get on with their work.” Others pointed out that the 
security forces no longer see them as ‘enemies’ but as ‘compañeros’ (comrades). This 
positive collaboration can be traced to the fact that UDESTRO is staffed by representatives 
of the coca union, which in turn has enhanced the legitimacy of the institution but also the 
state itself. As one farmer said, “They understand that we depend on coca… We can talk to 
them, and if there is a problem then we can find a solution.” In sum, most farmers agree that 
limiting coca cultivation is a small price to pay for peace and full citizenship. 
 
A new development paradigm 
Since 2006 the MAS government has promoted economic development in coca growing 
regions. However, unlike the previous strategy, access to assistance is no longer conditional 
on the prior eradication of coca. This is important, because farmers claim that the economic 
safety net provided by the cato (around US$200 per month which is equivalent to the 
minimum wage) means that they are now more willing to risk investing effort, time and 
capital in alternative livelihood strategies.  
Farmers and government outreach workers say that government-backed fish-farming and 
crop substitution programmes are starting to yield positive results. Reduced dependence on 
coca is reflected in the fact that some farmers now describe the cato as a ‘savings account’ 
rather than their main source of income. As one farmer said, “You earn money to fill your 
stomach from something else, but coca is for saving.” Indeed in November 2013 a leader at 
a coca union meeting remarked: “Today we are not only cocaleros, we are also bananeros 
(banana growers) and palmiteros (palm heart growers).” These upbeat accounts are 
corroborated by UN data: in 2011 bananas covered the largest cultivated area in the 
Chapare followed by citrus fruit and palm heart (Ledebur and Youngers 2013: 4).  
Government investment in infrastructure, institutional strengthening and social development 
has brought the Chapare into the social and economic mainstream. Chapare residents claim 
that today there are more jobs in non-agricultural work, government scholarships mean that 
their children can now study at university, and access to cheap government loans has 
allowed them to start up their own businesses (such as shops and taxis). Accordingly the 
local economy has started to grow. The improved economic situation is evidenced by the 
proliferation of second-hand motorbikes, home improvements, and a steep increase in land 
prices. To give an idea of the economic transformation that has taken place, one farmer 
said: “At the fiestas they don’t drink chicha (homebrew) anymore, now they only drink 
(bottled) beer and rum.” By addressing the underlying causes of coca cultivation, including 
the lack of state presence, poverty, and social exclusion, coca crop reductions may prove to 
be more sustainable than those achieved under forced eradication.   
The benefits of government-backed development projects are uneven, however. Most of the 
government investment has focused on areas close to main roads. Meanwhile, those who 
live in isolated hilly regions still face many of the same challenges. In these areas crops do 
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not grow well on the steep slopes, the sandy earth means that coca yields are far lower than 
in flat areas and the lack of roads and bridges makes marketing produce all but impossible. 
Some farmers are therefore calling for greater government investment in infrastructure and 
support to aid the diversification of economic activities (including tourism and beekeeping), 
and there is a growing call for the right to plant two catos of coca so that they can meet their 
subsistence needs. The cato agreement is built on trust and requires farmers to make 
significant sacrifices so that all may benefit. If some farmers feel that they are paying a 
higher price than others, then it could undermine the long-term functioning of the entire 
system. 
Coca legalisation 
Morales, armed with a bag of coca leaves and backed by the UN’s Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, has gone before the UN on numerous occasions to urge the world’s 
leaders to remove coca leaf from the list of controlled substances. Morales argues that the 
ban on coca is not only a historic mistake, but also discriminatory towards Andean peoples. 
These efforts have not been met with success, however. The G8 countries, led by the US, 
have countered Bolivia’s demand, arguing that de-listing coca would threaten the integrity of 
the international drug control system. Nevertheless Morales did score a minor victory in 
2013, when Bolivia won the right to allow traditional coca consumption within its territory, 
thus reconciling Bolivia’s international commitments with its 2009 Constitution, which 
declares that the state has a duty to preserve and protect coca chewing as an ancestral 
practice. However, while Morales venerates coca leaf, when it comes to cocaine his 
government remains firmly committed to prohibitionist policies.   
The government has promoted the industrialisation of coca-based products including 
manufactured teas, skin creams and diet pills. But the continued illegality of coca leaf at the 
international level means that exporting coca-based products remains a long way off, and 
the domestic legal market cannot soak up current production. A recent EU study found that 
Bolivia requires 14,000 hectares to satisfy domestic demand (Página Siete 2013), far short 
of Bolivia’s actual production, which stands at 23,000 hectares. Thus the government-built 
coca processing plant in the Chapare, which was inaugurated over five years ago, runs well 
below capacity and the union’s plans to cultivate organic coca for the legal market are in 
disarray. Given the limited legal market and the higher prices paid by traffickers, much of the 
Chapare coca crop is destined for the maceration pit where it is transformed into cocaine 
paste. 
Drug trafficking 
Bolivia’s coca policy is not designed to limit drug trafficking; however, there is evidence to 
suggest that the cato accord has made life harder for the drug workers in the Chapare. The 
coca growers are not opposed to cocaine production on moral grounds; they have very low 
levels of drug use in their communities and as far as they are concerned drug use is very 
much a ‘gringo’ problem. Moreover, to some extent they are dependent on the illicit trade as 
a market for their crop. Nevertheless, as a direct result of the cato accord they no longer 
tolerate drug production within their communities. As one drug worker commented, “Before, 
the compas (coca growers) would tell you when the UMOPAR (anti-drug police) were 
coming. Now they just turn you in.”   
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The coca growers’ hardened stance to drug production stems from the fact that they have 
become stakeholders with official land titles and a legal cato of coca; in other words, they 
now have something to lose. If a union commission finds a functioning – or even abandoned 
– drug production site on a union member’s property, then they will impose sanctions. This 
might include the indefinite suspension of the right to grow coca or, in extreme cases, 
expulsion from the community. Meanwhile, if the police catch the drug workers they face 
considerable prison sentences. Given the slim profits from drug production, most coca 
growers consider that it is simply not worth the risk.9 The drug workers are feeling the pinch: 
as a result of pressure from the unions, they have been forced to set up production sites in 
ever more remote areas, and many have relocated their operations outside of the Chapare 
(Grisaffi 2014).  
In spite of the coca growers’ sincere efforts to limit coca cultivation and tackle drug 
production, Bolivia is facing a growing drug trade, along with the associated problems of 
violence and corruption (Farthing and Kohl 2014: 139-142). Part of the problem stems from 
the fact that Bolivia has become a major transit route for much cheaper Peruvian cocaine 
paste, which is trafficked to Argentina and Brazil (now the world’s second largest market for 
cocaine). The Bolivian government is keen to show the international community that it is 
committed to tackling the emerging drug problem, and has taken an uncompromising 
approach to enforcement. In spite of drastic cuts to US funding10 (which went from US$41 
million in 2006 to zero by September 2013), the Bolivian security forces have nevertheless 
increased the seizures of illicit narcotics and the destruction of drug laboratories. For 
example, between 2006 and 2012 the police confiscated 187 tons of pure cocaine, a 234% 
increase when compared to the 56 tons that were confiscated under the DEA’s watch from 
1999 to 2005 (La Razón 2013b). Since 2008 Bolivia has worked with its neighbours on 
counter-narcotics initiatives and has signed bilateral agreements with Brazil, Peru, Argentina 
and Colombia.  
Conclusion 
Collaborative coca reduction seems to be paying off: the most recent UN coca survey 
reported that in 2013 coca cultivation in Bolivia stood at 23,000 hectares, the lowest level 
recorded since 2002, and a 26% drop when compared to 2010 figures (UNODC 2014). 
Success can be measured in terms of hectares of coca crop reduced, but perhaps a more 
appropriate metric is to assess coca grower welfare, and on this score Bolivia is excelling. 
Since the inauguration of the cato accord, the Chapare’s economy has picked up, human 
rights violations have decreased, and living standards have improved. While the US has 
remained highly critical of cooperative coca control, multilateral organisations have been 
more positive. In a recent report the Organization of American States (2013) classified the 
Bolivian experiment as “best practice” that is worthy of replication, and the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime has commended Bolivia’s innovative policy, saying “the progress 
in Bolivia is undeniable” (Ledebur and Youngers 2013). 
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The idea that coca can be eradicated entirely and that this will prevent the drug trade is a 
dangerous myth. As long as there is demand for cocaine then people will continue to 
cultivate coca leaf as it represents a solution to their subsistence needs. If Washington-
based policy makers remain firmly committed to supply-side enforcement then, at the very 
least, they should take note of the lessons learned in Bolivia. Engaged, healthy farmers 
cultivating less coca is preferable to the cycle of violence, instability and economic insecurity 
provoked by forced eradication. A still better solution would be for the US and other G8 
countries to back Bolivia’s call to legalise coca, which would open out new markets for coca-
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